Releases
Every release, security fix and change to SignalVault, published with a date.
API keys are stored only as an HMAC-SHA256 hash.
Each API key is stored as an HMAC-SHA256 hash, keyed with a secret held outside the database, and looked up by that hash alone. Raw keys are never stored. Existing keys keep working; there is nothing to change.
Every identifier the PII rule detects is listed in the docs and the rule editor, and each match is confirmed before it counts.
Turning a rule on or off, editing, saving and deleting it on the dashboard act only on rules of the app you are viewing, which is checked against your account.
Prompts, responses, tool calls and error text are encrypted before they are written. If encryption is unavailable, the event is not stored: the API answers 503 encryption_unavailable, and the same event can be sent again with its event_id. The SDKs retry once on their own.
The site and the API refuse TLS 1.0 and 1.1 and use TLS 1.3 wherever the client supports it.
The changelog, the security page and the blog are rebuilt to be read on any screen, with feeds you can subscribe to.
If a guardrail on the proxy fails, the log records the kind of error and nothing from the request or response.
Error reports exclude request headers that carry credentials: authorization, cookie, your SignalVault key, the provider key sent on proxy requests, and the Stripe webhook signature. This applies to every route.
Request bodies are not attached to error reports for API, proxy and webhook requests, so prompts stay out of them. On dashboard pages, form fields that hold a secret and single-use links are masked.
Anything shaped like an API key, bearer token or webhook secret is masked in the text of an error report before it is sent.
Tool-call guardrails now run on streaming responses, which is how most chat interfaces work.
Prompt and response payloads are encrypted at rest across every decision — allowed, flagged, redacted and blocked. Error text captured from providers is encrypted as well.
Regular expressions in the rules engine run with bounds against pathological input, request body sizes are capped on ingest and on the proxy, and dependencies are checked against published advisories on every change.
Repeated sign-in and password-reset attempts are rate limited.
The export endpoint caps the days parameter at 365, and app ownership is checked on every dashboard view, including live event updates.
Authorization checks are applied across all dashboard views.
Session cookies moved from SameSite=Lax to SameSite=Strict. This returned to Lax in 0.14.0 to keep sessions working across external links.
A security contact is published at /.well-known/security.txt, so researchers have a documented way to report issues.
Each app is strictly scoped to its owner account on every load.
Cloudflare Turnstile and disposable-email domain blocking on sign-up.
Verification is required before dashboard access, with rate-limited resend.
All prompts and responses are encrypted at rest.